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Abstract. This paper explores Walter Benjamin’s relationship with French Surrealism 
from sources rarely studied or practically unknown until now. First, I will set out the 
direct link between the theses on “profane illumination” and the “organization of pes-
simism” in Der Sürrealismus. Die letzte Momentaufnahme der europäischen Intelligenz, 
and various texts by Pierre Naville, one of the most active figures in the Surrealist 
movement between 1925 and 1929. Second, I will consider Benjamin’s commentaries 
in Pariser Passagen <I> and convolute “S” of the Passagen-Werk about Surrealist writ-
ings and Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, flagging up the implications of this con-
frontation for Benjamin’s ideas of secularization of mysticism and messianism. Lastly, 
I will seek to refine the meaning of Benjamin’s “anthropological materialism” and its 
relevance to those sections of the Passagenarbeit that are dedicated to the evolution of 
social movements since the French Revolution.
Key words. Pierre Naville, Surrealist illumination, Secularization of mysticism, Nihil-
ism, Martin Heidegger.
In memoriam Karlheinz Barck 
In a letter to Gershom Scholem, written in Berlin at the end of 
October 1928, Walter Benjamin said: «To cleanse the work [the Pas-
sagenarbeit] of its ostentatious proximity to the Surrealist movement, 
that, understandable and well-founded as it may be, could become 
disastrous for me, I have had to expand it more and more in my 
mind, and make it so universal within its most particular and min-
ute framework that it might take possession of the legacy of Surreal-
ism, albeit in purely temporal terms, and with all the command of 
a philosophical Fortinbras» (Benjamin [1925-1930]: 622, 420)1. Ben-
1 All translated quotations that appeared in this paper both from German and 
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jamin’s first assessment of this legacy came, in the 
months that followed, in the form of his essay 
Der Sürrealismus. Die letzte Momentaufnahme 
der europäischen Intelligenz, published in “Die lit-
erarische Welt” in February 1929. Much more 
elaborate than Traumkitsch (1926-1927), which 
was dedicated to the analysis of Répétitions (1922) 
by Paul Éluard, with drawings by Max Ernst, of 
André Breton’s Manifeste du surréalisme (1924) 
and of Louis Aragon’s Une vague de rêves (1924), 
this second work on the movement expanded 
Benjamin’s bibliography significantly, and aspired 
to be, as we see in the preliminary remarks, a 
«dialectical critique of Surrealism» (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 3, 1037, 1039). In other words, if 
Der Sürrealismus, as Benjamin comments in letters 
of the same period, represented a form of intro-
duction or «an opaque paravent» in front of the 
Passagenarbeit (Benjamin, [1925-1930]: 630, 472), 
then this was because the text set out for the first 
time the fundamental framework of what, refer-
ring to Paris, die Hauptstadt des XIX Jahrhunderts 
(1934), Benjamin would characterize as «the phil-
osophical exploitation of Surrealism and, as such, 
its Aufhebung» (Benjamin [1935-1937]: 978, 138). 
In the second paragraph of Der Surrealismus, 
Benjamin places the discussion on the legacy of 
the movement under a triple historic-conceptual 
lighting. First, he asserts that the German observer 
is long «acquainted with the crisis of the intelli-
gentsia or, more precisely, with that of the human-
istic concept of freedom»; he maintains, in addi-
tion, that a «frenetic determination» has become 
apparent in the context of this crisis «to step out 
of the stage of eternal discussions and come to a 
decision (Entscheidung) at any price»; finally, he 
refers to the extremely difficult position – that he 
can himself testify to – of left-wing intellectuals, 
grappling with the tension between «an anarchist 
fronde and a revolutionary discipline» (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 1, 295; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 
207). In the following pages, I will seek to exam-
ine these three issues, as they are addressed in this 
essay, by relating them to other writings by Benja-
French are my own. 
min and the surrealists’ texts he refers to directly 
or indirectly. I intend especially to show, as thor-
oughly as I can, that the confrontation with the 
experience of Surrealism plays a preponderant role 
in Benjamin’s thought that has not been clarified 
so far. My thesis is that his «dialectical critique of 
Surrealism» is neither limited to litterary or artis-
tic matters, nor to the methodology of the Pas-
sagenarbeit with respect to Aragon’s Le Paysan de 
Paris (1926)2, but projects itself on his reflections 
regarding the political praxis and  the philosophy 
of history.
First I shall refer to the relation between the 
theses on «profane illumination» and the «organi-
zation of pessimism» from Benjamin’s essay, with 
some texts by Pierre Naville, then one of the most 
active figures of the Surrealist group, at the core of 
the internal debate on the relation between Sur-
realism and Marxism. Then I shall examine the 
opposition between Martin Heidegger’s Sein und 
Zeit (1927) and the writings of the Surrealists that 
Benjamin states in the notes of Pariser Passagen < 
I> and in his review of the book by Albert Béguin 
L’âme romantique et les rêves (1937), in the light 
of two questions in particular: the contemporary 
trends of nihilism and the secularization of mys-
ticism. I shall conclude by taking as main theme 
a letter Benjamin addressed to Scholem in 1930, 
where Benjamin manifests his interest in the criti-
cal writings of the former Surrealist Emmanuel Berl 
in order to define the meaning of «anthropological 
materialism» in opposition to orthodox Marxism, 
on the one hand, and to the legacy of Romanticism 
and the French revolutionary movements of the 
Nineteenth Century, on the other hand. 
2 On Benjamin and Surrealism see Carchia [1986], 
Fürnkäs [1988], Cohen [1993], McCole [1993: 206-252], 
Lachaud [1994a], Barck [2006], Lowy [1996, 2000: 39-58; 
2007; 2014], Lindner [2009] and the texts by Matthias 
Bickenbach, Roberto Calasso, Javier Cercas, Aris Fiore-
tos, Lars  Friedrich, Dirk Knipphals, Uwe Kolbe, Thom-
as Küpper, Burkhardt Lindner, Winfried Menninghaus, 
W. S. Merwin, Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo, Anja Nowak, 
Wells Tower, Niels Werber, Nadine Werner and Irving 
Wohlfahrt collected in Kupper [2012]. See also Ibarlucía 
[1997a; 1997b; 1998].
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1. SURREALIST ILLUMINATION AND ÉTAT DE 
FUREUR
After André Breton, Louis Aragon, Paul Éluard 
and Benjamin Péret publicly pledged allegiance 
to the Parti Communiste Français  (PCF), an 
important discussion took place inside the Sur-
realist movement: should the term “Surrealist” be 
avoided as the predicate of a social revolution of 
the Bolshevik kind, or, on the contrary, should it 
invoke a liberation of the “spirit” beyond all deter-
mined historico-political recognition? From the 
pages of “La Révolution surréaliste”, founded in 
December 1924, and the “Bureau des Recherches 
Surréalistes”, headed by Antonin Artaud, it was 
framed as an attack on social institutions – uni-
versities, the army, psychiatric hospitals, the 
Church of Rome – and called for a struggle that 
most members of the movement considered pre-
mature and incoherent. Convinced of the need to 
find a precise objective for the “Surrealist revolu-
tion”, some of its members set themselves the task 
of defining it. So it was that in March 1925, an 
«ideological committee» was created, whose first 
task consisted in calling a meeting to address an 
urgent question: «to decide whether or not the 
idea of revolution should be privileged over the 
Surrealist idea, whether one is a tributary of the 
other or whether the two run parallel» (Naville 
[1975]: 19). At the first session, Naville tried with-
out success to rally support for the following dec-
laration, included a year later in La Révolution et 
les intellectuels (1926): 
Signatory members of “La Révolution surréaliste”, 
meeting on the 2nd of April 1925 with the aim of 
determining which of the two principles, Surrealist or 
revolutionary, is the most apt to direct its course of 
action, failed to reach an understanding on the issue, 
but have agreed on the following: 
1. That, above all Surrealist or revolutionary con-
cerns, what prevails in its spirit is a certain state of 
furor. 
2. We believe that only by way of this furor are we 
capable of reaching what might be called “Surrealist 
illumination”. 
3. That one of our first aims is the elucidation of a 
number of points on which this furor is an attack. 
4. We see only one positive aspect around which all 
members of “La Révolution surréaliste” should unite: 
knowledge that the Spirit is an essentially irreducible 
principle and one that cannot be fixed, either in life 
or beyond it. (ibid., 20-21, 73) 
The importance of this text for Benjamin’s 
interpretation of Surrrealism has passed unno-
ticed: the notions of illumination surréaliste and 
état de fureur that appear here correspond with 
the notions of profane Erleuchtung and Rausch in 
the essay of 1929 (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 
297, 308; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 209, 216; Benja-
min [1892-1940]: II, 3, 1038). In fact, La Révolu-
tion et les intellectuels, like Naville’s article Mieux 
et moins bien (1927), are the main sources for 
the second part of Der Sürrealismus. Naville’s 
first writing, subtitled Que peuvent faire les Surré-
alistes? Position de la question, takes up the frus-
trated debate of the “ideological committee” in the 
first months of 1925 that led to the failure of the 
cooperation accord with Clarté and other groups 
allied with the PCF. Naville holds that the ori-
gin of Surrealism is «principally speculative»: it 
departs abstractly from anarchy like «a movement 
of revolt against all contemporary intellectual pro-
duction» (Naville [1975]: 64). However, the «met-
aphysical position» its members tend to adopt 
derives partly from «the confusion into which 
they fall when they refuse to recognize that the 
intellectual force they claim, places them in the 
field of direct struggle» against the bourgeoisie, 
and that «it is likely in this field that such force 
will find its full use» (ibid., 70). 
Underlining the need to clarify this «ambigu-
ous intellectual and moral situation», Naville sug-
gests two possible ways forward: «to persevere in 
a negative stance of anarchic order, a false or a 
priori stance that does not justify the idea of rev-
olution» invoked by Surrealism, or else «to com-
mit themselves fully to the revolutionary route, 
the only revolutionary route: the Marxist route» 
(ibid., 76-77). In other words, the dilemma would 
be as follows: «do Surrealists believe in libera-
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tion of the spirit, before the abolition of the bour-
geois conditions of material life and, to a certain 
extent, independent of them, or, on the contrary, 
does the abolition of the bourgeois conditions of 
material life constitute a necessary condition for 
the liberation of the spirit?» (ibid., 85). By way of 
various artistic, literary and pseudo-mystical prac-
tices, the Surrealists have developed «an entirely 
romantic experience of things» (ibid., 86) that 
keeps the movement effortlessly tied to the bour-
geois sphere. Nonetheless, if according to its own 
“dialectic” Surrealism chooses to yield to the rev-
olution, it must free itself of this burden and join 
in with «the disciplined action of class struggle» 
(ibid., 77) in such a way that, aligning itself with 
the Third International and Bolshevik politics, 
it might be capable of participating in the strug-
gle for a dictatorship of the proletariat. Against 
Artaud, Naville critiques the tendency to interpret 
Surrealism as a revolt against «Western mentality» 
(ibid., 89).
 In the first place, he urges the abandonment 
of the myth of a «return to the East» and brands 
obscurantist any contempt for the conquests of 
science and technology, reminding that «what 
constitutes the riches of modern life, machines 
(more specifically: dominion of the metallurgic 
and textile industries, precision machinery, means 
of transport etc. and all their applications) are 
the matter in which the Surrealists, among oth-
ers, have discovered the splendid» (ibid., 90). In 
the second place, Naville indicates that the spirit 
of revolt and the «absolutely subversive will» of 
Surrealism cannot find satisfaction in «individual 
furor», in a passion relative to the individual, but 
in a «general passion» that «denies all aristocracy» 
(ibid., 91). In the third place, considering it unjus-
tifiable from a Marxist point of view to oppose 
East and West, Naville maintains that «when Sur-
realism enlists in the exclusive recognition [¼] of 
the life of the dream, of the Eastern spirit imag-
ined as contemplation, a separation from mate-
rial reality, it takes the wrong path», and, osten-
sibly guided by moral considerations, points in 
the opposite direction to «the elementary needs 
of the proletarian revolution» (ibid., 96). Lastly, 
after questioning actions such as the pamphlet Un 
cadavre (1924) against Anatole France («May he 
who dies surrounded by beatitude in turn become 
smoke!»), the anti-nationalist taunt of the banquet 
in homage to Saint-Pol-Roux («Long live the Ger-
mans») or the Lettre ouverte à Paul Claudel («It 
is not possible to be a French ambassador and a 
poet»), he concludes that «the quarrels of the 
intelligentia are entirely vain» before the univo-
cal reality of capitalism: «the Salary is a material 
necessity to which three quarters of the world’s 
population are subject, independent of the origin 
of their moral or philosophical positions, called 
Eastern or Western» (ibid., 97; see also Breton 
[1982]: 24, 50, 53-54). 
«By mid-October 1927, in number 9/10 of “La 
Révolution surréaliste”, Naville publishes Mieux 
et moins bien, where he returns to the theses of 
La Révolution et les Intellectuels. Denouncing the 
charms of psychologism once more, throwing out 
Breton’s counterarguments in Légitime defense 
(1926), and judging as vain – though doubtless 
in good faith – the efforts of the letters written 
by Breton, Louis Aragon, Paul Éluard, Benjamin 
Péret and Pierre Unik in Au grand jour (1927) 
to render Surrealism and Marxism compatible, 
Naville proposes that, instead of «theoretical enig-
mas» setting out a task ill-suited to Surrealism, 
it would be preferable to put the notion of «pes-
simism» into play, a notion around which exists a 
considerable lack of reflection (Naville [1927]: 57). 
Pessimism, properly understood, «addresses in a 
general way the virtue of Surrealism, its current 
reality, and perhaps even more its future develop-
ments»:  «serious, tireless» spirits of all ages, «that 
are harshly applied to their object, share certain 
fundamental despair» (ibid., 58). 
In so far as it is a «search for extreme means» 
to escape the perplexities of a difficult era «pessi-
mism is the point of origin of Hegelian philoso-
phy and is also the source of Marx’s revolution-
ary method» (ibid.). For this reason, it must not 
be confused with «contemplation» or «skepticism» 
which is its outward appearance (ibid.). «Despera-
tion», the mother of pessimism, «is a violent pas-
sion» that «is nourished by deep and prolonged 
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desires» and «puts patience to the test» (ibid.). A 
far cry from those who would see it progress, like 
all European intelligence, «in the direction of a 
humanism», Surrealism, rather, faces the task of 
«organizing pessimism»: 
The organization of pessimism is one of the strang-
est slogans that conscious man can obey. Nonetheless, 
we demand this method – if it can be so called – be 
bound to it, and it would be fairer to say: this ten-
dency allows and may continue to allow us to observe 
the highest partiality; it will prevent us, at the same 
time, from despairing, that is to say, we will maintain 
our absolute right to existence in this world. 
So pessimism cannot be developed nor can its effects 
be prolonged by simple verbal affirmation. This affir-
mation can be prompted all too easily by any failed 
attempt, by any disappointment. 
In this way, only living resources can find a mean-
ing in pessimism worthy of the years accumulated at 
our feet. We must organize pessimism; or, moreover, 
given that this is not about responding to a call, we 
must let it be organized in the direction of the next 
call. (ibid., 60)
The imprint of Naville’s ideas in Benjamin’s 
essay goes beyond the link I have shown with pro-
fane Erleuchtung and Rausch. Numerous observa-
tions on the «dialectic evolution» of Surrealism 
from «an extreme contemplative position» to «a 
revolutionary attitude» show the text explicitly 
taking up the thesis of Mieux et moins bien on the 
«organization of pessimism» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: II, 1, 308; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 216). Fol-
lowing Naville, Benjamin maintains that in order 
to understand the developments achieved by Sur-
realism, it is necessary to confront Surrealism with 
the typical thought of «the left-wing French intel-
ligentsia» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 304; Ben-
jamin [1927-1930]: 213). Characteristics of this 
bourgeois position, in which «moral idealism» and 
«political praxis» are incurably coupled, are clear-
ly demonstrated in the attitude toward the Soviet 
Union (ibid.). Faced with this state of things, the 
Surrealists have made their own «a radical concept 
of freedom», unknown in Europe since Bakun-
in: the Surrealists were «the first to liquidate the 
sclerotic liberal-moral-humanistic ideal of free-
dom» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 306; Benjamin 
[1927-1930]: 215). In testimony of this, Benjamin 
cites (partially and in his own translation) a par-
agraph of Nadja, where Breton says that «free-
dom, which can be bought only with a thousand 
of the hardest sacrifices, demands to be enjoyed 
unrestrictedly in its fullness without any kind 
of pragmatic calculation, given that mankind’s 
struggle, conceived in its most simple revolution-
ary form, which is, precisely, liberation in every 
aspect according to the means available to each of 
us, continues to be the only cause worth serving» 
(ibid.; see also Breton [1964]: 168).
The question at hand is whether Surrealism 
is in a position to integrate this anarchic experi-
ence of freedom with the «constructive, dictato-
rial experience of revolution», whether or not it is 
truly capable, in short, of «binding revolt to revo-
lution» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 307; Benja-
min [1927-1930]: 215). In all revolutionary action, 
as Naville notes, there is an «état de fureur» that 
identifies itself with an anarchic element. Benja-
min’s answer is the watchword: «To win the forces 
of Rausch for revolution» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: 
II, 1, 307-308; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 215-216). 
To emphasize anarchic element exclusively means 
to renounce «the methodical and disciplinary 
preparation of the revolution» and, fundamentally, 
not to comprehend the «dialectic of Rausch», that 
is, the necessary transmutation from an individual 
psychological state to a collective bodily experi-
ence. As Naville states in the project of declara-
tion set out in La Révolution et les intellectuels, the 
point is to reach «by way of this furor [¼] what 
could be called ‘Surrealist illumination’» (Naville 
[1975]: 73). Benjamin, expurgating the concept of 
all esoteric implication, prefers to speak of a pro-
fane Erleuchtung that he defines as «a materialist, 
anthropological inspiration» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: II, 1, 297; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 209). 
Indeed, the surrealist conception of the nature of 
Rausch is «undialectical» and its theory of art «is 
entangled in a number of very pernicious roman-
tic prejudices»; instead a serious study of «pro-
fane illumination» has as precondition «a dialec-
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tical implication» that a romantic mind entirely 
ignores:
Stressing pathetically or fanatically the enigmatic side 
of the enigma takes us no further; on the contrary, 
we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we 
find it in daily life, by virtue of a dialectical optic that 
perceives daily  as impenetrable, the impenetrable as 
daily life. The most passionate investigation of tele-
pathic phenomena, for example, will not teach us half 
as much about reading (which is an eminently tel-
epathic process) as the profane illumination of read-
ing will teach us about telepathic phenomena. Or the 
most passionate investigation of the hashish trance 
will not teach us half as much about thinking (which 
is eminently narcotic) as the profane illumination of 
thinking will teach us about the hashish trance. The 
reader, the thinker, the expectant, the flâneur are 
types of enlightened just as much as the opium eater, 
the dreamer, the drunken. And more profane. Not to 
mention the most terrible drug – ourselves – which 
we take in solitude. (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 
307-308; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 216)
According to Benjamin, «to win the forces 
of Rausch for the revolution» does not involve a 
«poetic politics», in the nature of the rhetoric of 
the social-democrat progressivism that promises 
«the finer future» of humanity, in which all shall 
act «as if they were angels» and everyone shall 
have as much «as if they were rich» and shall live 
«as if they were free» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 
1, 308; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 216). Against this 
«unscrupulous, dilettantish optimism», Naville 
proposed the «organization of pessimism», by 
approaching surrealism to the Communist answer. 
The radical meaning of this slogan is: «Pessimism 
all along the line. Absolutely and by all means. 
Mistrust in the fate of literature, mistrust in the 
fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of European 
humanity, but particularly mistrust, mistrust and 
mistrust in all reconciliation: between classes, 
between nations, between individuals. And unlim-
ited trust only in IG Farben and the peaceful per-
fecting of the air force» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: 
II, 1, 308; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 216-217). In this 
sense, Benjamin implicitly assumes that a political 
poetics must be implemented in opposition to the 
«poetic politics» of the left-wing bourgeois intel-
ligentsia. Louis Aragon’s distinction in Traité du 
style (1928) between comparison or metaphor and 
image needs in fact extending on a political plan, 
for organizing pessimism means nothing oth-
er than to literalize the «as if», that is to say: «to 
haul out moral metaphor from politics and to dis-
cover in the space of political action the one hun-
dred per cent image space (Bildraum)» (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 1, 309; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 
217; Aragon [1983]: 151).
2. NIHILISM AND SECULARIZATION OF 
MYSTICISM
In the notes of Pariser Passagen <I>, written 
between June 1927 and December 1929, Benja-
min significantly establishes a sharp opposition 
between Heidegger and Surrealism. According to 
him, it would be of «vital interest to recognize, at 
a particular point of development, thoughts at a 
crossroads: the new view on the historical world 
at the point where the decision (Entscheidung) is 
forthcoming to its reactionary or revolutionary 
exploitation» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, Oº, 4, 
1026; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 857). In this sense, 
what is put to work in Sein und Zeit and the polit-
ical position adopted in the texts of Naville, Bre-
ton and other members of the Surrealist move-
ment would be the same thing with antitheti-
cal resolutions. The observation appears slightly 
expanded in the convolute S of the Passagen-Werk: 
Of vital interest to recognize a particular point of 
development as a crossroad. The new historical 
thought, characterized both in general and in details 
by a higher concreteness, redemption of periods of 
decline, revision of periodization, presently stands 
at this point, and its utilization in a reactionary or 
revolutionar[y] sense is now being decided. What is 
announced in the writings of the Surrealists and in 
the new book by Heidegger is the same crisis in its 
two possible solutions. (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, 
S1, 6, 676; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 544-545)
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We know that Benjamin’s divergences with Hei-
degger’s conception of historical world date back to 
his youth3. On the horizon of the Passagenarbeit, the 
importance of a critical dispute with Heidegger is 
clearly stated in a letter to Gershom Scholem, writ-
ten in French and dated in Paris January 20th 1930: 
«What appears to me today as an established fact 
is that for this book as well as for the Trauerspiel, I 
cannot dispense with an introduction about the the-
ory of knowledge – and, this time, especially about 
the knowledge of history. It is there that I shall find 
Heidegger on my path and I expect some sparks to 
fly from the clash of our very different ways of con-
sidering history» (Benjamin [1925-1930]: 671, 503). 
Although the idea of this confrontation with Hei-
degger’s philosophy of history was abandoned after 
1933, when Benjamin joined the Institut für Sozi-
alforschung and he reformulated the Passagenarbe-
it, the final phase of his work allowed a glimpse of 
some aspects in relation to which these crossroads 
of historical thought, exploited in «a reactionary or 
revolutionary sense», which he believes were antici-
pated in Sein und Zeit and in the Surrealists’ texts 
still guide his reflections.  
I would like, to this effect, to refer to two writ-
ings of this period, where he expanded this con-
frontation4. The first one is Über den Begriff der 
Geschichte. As we can see in his drafts, Benjamin 
went back over the issue of the «organization of 
pessimism», whose aim is just to «discover, in the 
space of political action, the… image space» (Ben-
jamin [1892-1940]: I, 3, 1234; Benjamin [1938-
1940]: 404). The firm nature of this pessimism is 
shown in thesis VIII, through a paradoxical devel-
opment reformulation of Carl Schmitt’s politi-
3 With regard to this subject, see Caygill [1994], Schwarz 
Wentzer [1998: 82-92], Ibarlucía [2000; 2005], Fenves 
[2010]: 103-124.
4 For its implications in the field of aesthetics and theo-
ry of art, see Soussana [1999], Desideri [1983; 1999], 
Knocke [2000], Long [2001], Hanssen [2005], Lindner 
[2006], Ibarlucía [2014] and the recent book compiled 
by Benjamin and Vardoulakis [2017] with contributions 
by Peter Fenves, Gerhard Richter, Ilit Ferber, A. Kiarina 
Kordela, Paula Scwebel, Antonia Egel, Joanna Hodge, 
Krzysztof Ziarek, David Ferris and the editors.
cal “decisionism”: «The tradition of the oppressed 
teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ that we live 
in is the rule» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 2, 697; see 
Schmitt [1922]: 11-41, 49; Schmitt [1928]: XIV). As 
to the image space opening up in the profane illu-
mination, it is taken up especially in thesis V, where 
Benjamin speaks of «the authentic image of the 
past» that «fleets by» and arises in a lightning only 
to fade away forever «at the instant of its knowa-
bility» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 2, 695; Benja-
min [1938-1940]: 390; Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 3, 
1261). We can mention in that regard a continuum 
line in Benjamin’s thought. In a 1920/1921 frag-
ment on Erkenntnistheorie, he had already stated 
two things: on one hand, that «the now of knowa-
bility is logical time, which has to replace that of 
timeless validity», for «the world is knowable now»; 
on the other hand, that «[a]cts, like perception», 
which are «unbroken in the perfected state of the 
world», «enter only broken, inauthentic, unreal in 
the the now of knowability» in the form of «sym-
bolic concepts»: «Truth, too, is authentic and unbro-
ken in the perfected state of the world, but it alone 
is also unbroken in the now of knowability» (Ben-
jamin [1892-1940]: VI, 46; Benjamin [1913-1926]: 
276-277). A few years later, in the convolute N of 
the Passagen-Werk, the image of the Jetzt der Erk-
ennbarkeit was identified with the dialectical image, 
indicating that the materialist representation of his-
tory is eminently «figurative (bildlich)», unlike Hei-
degger’s «historicality», that rests upon phenome-
nological abstractions (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 1, 
N3, 1, 577-578; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 462). In the 
same convolute, Benjamin adds that the moment 
of historical conscious awaking «would be identical 
with the “now of knowability”, in which things put 
on their true – surrealist – face» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: V, 1, N3a, 3, 579; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 
463-464). It is at this moment that «the historian 
undertakes, with regard to that image, the task of 
dream interpretation» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 1, 
N4, 1, 581; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 464)5. 
5 On Benjamin’s notion of a Traumdeutung of collective 
dream and its relation to Surrealism, see Bischof, Lenk 
[1986] and Lenk [1998].
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 The epistemic concept of the Jetzt der Erk-
enbarkeit is closely related to that of the Jetztzeit, 
usually translated by «now-time», although in his 
own French version of his theses Benjamin pre-
fers the word «present» between quotation marks 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 3, 1266). After com-
paring the German manuscript that belonged to 
Hannah Arendt with the typewritten copy, found 
at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in 1981, 
Giorgio Agamben indicated that, in the thesis XIV 
of this version, the word Jetztzeit is also placed 
between quotation marks: «History is the subject 
of a construction whose place is not homogeneous 
and empty time but time filled full by “Jetztzeit”» 
(Agamben [2000]: 132; Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 
2, 70; Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 3, 1249). The quo-
tation marks disappeared when the same word 
was later used in thesis XVIII, which became the 
XIX after this copy was discovered: «The Jetztzeit, 
which as a model of messianic time, summarizes 
in an immense abbreviation the entire history of 
mankind, completely corresponds with the fig-
ure the history of mankind takes in the universe» 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 2, 703; Benjamin [1938-
1940]: 396). Agamben rightly reminds that in Ger-
man the philosophical history of the word «shows 
that it was generally associated with negative and 
anti-messianic connotations»; it appears so, for 
example, in Schopenhauer’s Parerga und Paral-
ipomena (1851): «This – our time – calls itself by 
a name as characteristic as it is euphemistic: yes, 
Jetztzeit, that is, only the now is explored and the 
time that comes and judges is not even glanced 
at» (Agamben [2000]: 133; Schopenhauer [1960-
1965]: IV, 213-214). Moreover, Hegel himself dis-
dains the fragile temporality of the Jetzt. In the 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), he dedicates 
the beginning of his analysis of «sensitive cer-
tainty» to explicate why the now, under the dou-
ble figure of the hic et nunc, is merely an illusion, 
something negative and void, which is nothing in 
essence and that only emerges when it disappears, 
something that escapes all enunciation, something 
unavailable to language (Hegel [1979]: I, 82-93).
Some decades ago, Werner Fuld suggested that 
Benjamin could have borrowed the word «Jetz-
tzeit» from Heidegger’s early essay Der Zeitbegriff 
in der Geschichtswissenschaft,  which was pub-
lished in 1916 (Fuld [1979]: 78). However, Hei-
degger does not use this word in this particular 
text but he does in Sein und Zeit (1927), the very 
work that Benjamin opposes to the Surrealists’ 
writings in his notes of the Pariser Passagen <I> 
and the convolute N of the Passagen-Werk. In Hei-
degger’s book, the expression «Jetzt-Zeit» – sepa-
rated by a dash – refers to «daily time as it is ‘seen’ 
on the clock» (Heidegger [1975-ss.]: II, 421); it 
relates to the inauthentic historicality of das Man, 
which conceals the originary individual destiny 
of the Dasein and displays its «everydayness» in 
inconstancy, in the expectation of «novelty» and 
in the pursuit of «the modern» (ibid., 391). Hei-
degger maintains that the «now» is essentially dif-
ferent from the «instant (Augenblick)», literally 
understood as «wink», just as the authentic pre-
sent differs from the inauthentic one (ibid., 337-
338). The «ecstatic unity» of this instant of vision 
constitutes the existential-ontological structure 
of temporality of the Dasein as an «illuminato 
(erleuchtet)» being, that is, «enlightened in itself 
as being-in-the-world, not by any other being, but 
in such a way that itself is the clearing (Lichtung)» 
(ibid., 133, 350). This «clearedness (Gelichtetheit)» 
is merely what makes «all illumination (Erleuch-
tung) and clarification (Erhellung)» possible (ibid., 
350-351). Thus, in the context of the exegesis of 
the «Care» that provides the world with its signifi-
cance, it becomes the condition of the Entschlos-
senheit, the anticipatory resoluteness of the future, 
which is no other than the authentic mode of the 
being-toward-death in which Dasein is charged 
with the task of assuming itself against its own 
nothingness (ibid., 385-386).
The historical knowledge of the truth, that Ben-
jamin thematizes as being inherent to the «now of 
knowability», is not an essential knowledge of this 
kind, an ontological revelation that founds «the 
originary and authentic temporality» of the being-
in-the-world of the Dasein (ibid., 329).. This knowl-
edge, says Benjamin in the same series of notes in 
Pariser Passagen <I> where we can read the remark 
on Sein und Zeit and on the writings of the Surreal-
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ist, «is possible only as overcoming the appearance» 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, Oº, 81, 1034-1035; 
Benjamin [1927-1940]: 864), in which the past, 
according to Heidegger, would be contained in the 
unity of the ecstasies of time. Yet this Aufhebung, 
adds Benjamin, «should not signify the volatiliza-
tion» nor «the actualization of the object», but «the 
configuration of a rapid image», in contrast to the 
«quietness» of essences; the ephemeral image that 
forms therein coincides with the «surrealist mien 
of things in the now», but not in the future: «The 
appearance overcome here is that an [e]arlier time 
is in the now. In truth: the [n]ow [is] the inmost 
image of what has been» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: 
V, 2, Oº, 81, 1034; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 865). 
Thus, in a paragraph of intertextual relevance with 
respect to Heidegger’s language, Benjamin says that 
«this now being», which is nothing but «the being 
now of the now time (das Jetztsein des Jetztzeit)», 
can achieve a high concreteness of the object by the 
«dialectical method» only within the framework 
of a philosophy of history that has overcome in 
all respects the ideology of progress and  replaced 
the historical view of the past by politics, that has 
transformed «political categories into theorical» 
and ensured that «any past event (for its time) can 
acquire a greater degree of actuality than it had at 
the time it took place», adapting it to the «concrete-
historical situation of the interest of the now time 
thanks to the image in which and by which it is 
comprehended» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, Oº, 5, 
1026; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 857).
For Benjamin, unlike Heidegger, the ephem-
eral Jetztzeit has an intensive significance. At 
the very core of his theory of secularization, in 
the Theologisch-politisches Fragment (1920/1921-
1922/1923), the profane temporality as «the 
rhythm of messianic nature» refers to the idea of 
happiness, the worldly restitutio in integrum that 
leads to the eternity of a downfall: «For nature is 
messianic by cause of its eternal and total transi-
ence» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 204; Benja-
min [1935-1938]: 306)6. To strive for the destruc-
6 On this topic, see Weigel [2008]: 27-56 and also Dub-
bels [2010]: 39-65.
tion of all earthly order is the task of revolution-
ary politics, «whose method must be called nihil-
ism» (ibid.). Benjamin sees the willingness of that 
restatement in the Surrealist discovery of «the 
revolutionary energies that appear in the “out-
moded”»: «No one before these visionaries and 
soothsayers ever noticed how misery, not only 
social but also architectonic, the misery of interi-
ors, enslaved and enslaving things, can be sudden-
ly changed into revolutionary nihilism» (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 1, 299; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 
210). In this sense, as Richard Wolin has pointed 
out, Benjamin’s interpretation of Surrealism, on 
the one hand, «bridges the gap» between his ear-
ly studies, openly metaphysical and theological, 
and the materialist principles of his later investi-
gation, having found an answer to his search for 
a «superior, noumenal concept of experience», 
which inspired his critique of Kant in Über das 
Programm der kommenden Philosophie (1917), in 
an idea of redemption «mainly as a secular, col-
lective and socio-historical phenomenon» (Wolin 
[1986]: 675); on the other hand, it allows to differ-
entiate «his own “conservative revolutionary” ten-
dency, his inclination to view radical destruction 
as a necessary prerequisite for cultural renewal, 
from those of his proto-fascist contemporaries», 
amongst others Gottfried Benn, Louis-Ferdinand 
Céline, Ludwig Klages, Carl Schmitt and Ernst 
Jünger (Wolin [1994]: XXVII).
Thus Benjamin identifies the «revolutionary 
nihilism» of the surrealists with the «anthropo-
logical materialism» and distinguishes it from the 
«anthropological nihilism» that he speaks of in 
the Passagen-Werk: the «specifically medical nihil-
ism», deriving from the sense of loss of the indi-
vidual confronted with the modern world (Benja-
min [1892-1940]: V, 1, K7 a, 2, 507, N8 a, 1, 590; 
Benjamin [1927-1940]: 402, 472). This last nihil-
ism manifested itself in a number of expression-
ist works, in which Carl Gustav Jung perceived a 
prophetical anticipation of the orientation of the 
conscience, and in which György Lukács detected 
a close relationship with the European extreme 
right-wing movements. This important distinc-
tion between two different forms of nihilism was 
148 Ricardo Ibarlucía
neglected by Karl-Heinz Bohrer, who assimilated 
Benjamin’s posture to that of Ernst Jünger in rela-
tion to a “decisionist” literary modernity, whose 
genealogy could go back to Friedrich Schlegel’s 
romantic messianism. In Bohrer’s view, they both 
shared the same concern about the growing mech-
anization of the Lebenswelt, which threatened 
to dissolve the chances of an authentic and truly 
transforming experience. Benjamin’s identifica-
tion to the «revolutionary nihilism» of the Sur-
realists would have, ultimately, a common matrix 
with Jünger’s «anthropological nihilism» (Bohrer 
[1978]: 190-200, 359-366). Nevertheless, Benja-
min criticizes harshly this kind of hygienic nihil-
ism and argues that its aesthetic cult of war is «a 
shameless transposition of the thesis of l’Art pour 
l’Art», as it can be read in Theorien des deutschen 
Fachismus (1930), his review of the anthology 
Krieg und Krieger, including essays by Ernst and 
Friedrich Gregor Jünger, Wilhelm von Schramm, 
Gerhard and Albrecht Erich Günther, Ernst von 
Salomon, Friedrich Hielscher and Werner Best 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: III, 240; Benjamin [1935-
1938]: 314). By employing a formulation which 
in Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit (1935-1939) will allow him to 
define the «aestheticization of politics» promoted 
by fascism in opposition to the «politicization of 
art» of communism (Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 
2, 467-469, 506-508, 737-739; Benjamin [1892-
1940]: VII, 1, 382-384), he maintains that war, 
«in the metaphysical abstraction» in which Jünger 
and German nationalist believe, «is nothing other 
than the attempt to resolve, mystically and without 
mediation, the secret of nature, understood ideal-
istically, through technique», rather than the eluci-
dation of the great changes industrial development 
had introduced and its use in favor of the secular 
interests of manhood (Benjamin [1892-1940]: III, 
247; Benjamin [1935-1938]: 319). 
The following text to which I would like to 
draw attention here is the bibliographical com-
mentary on Albert Béguin’s L’âme romantique et 
le rêve (1937), published by Benjamin in Maß und 
Wert at the beginning of 1939. In this review, Hei-
degger’s Existenzphilosophie is opposed to Surreal-
ism, as it was ten years earlier in Pariser Passagen 
<I>. German Romanticism, Benjamin holds, is 
not represented by Béguin «as the matrix of the 
French Romanticism, but as the Romantic phe-
nomenon par excellence, on the grounds of which 
the initiation in this movement of spirit has to 
take place» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: III, 557; Ben-
jamin [1938-1940]: 153). In his historical con-
struction, Surrealism certainly appears to be the 
absolute heir of German Romanticism, as it is 
inferred from the fact that the book opens with 
an epigraph from Aragon’s Une vague de rêves, 
while the penultimate chapter, entitled Naissance 
de la poésie, explicitly sets out this idea through 
a reflection on Aragon’s text, the first Manifeste 
du surréalisme, Breton’s Les vases communicants 
(1932) and the poetry of Paul Éluard. 
According to Béguin, Symbolism had pre-
pared the way for a generation of French poets 
who, in the years following the First World War, 
made two aspects of Rimbaud’s program their 
own: «metaphysical revolt against the imperfect 
human condition and delicate attention to the rev-
elations of the unconscious» (Béguin [1939]: 390). 
During the Dadaist period, new poetry expressed 
itself above all as denial and eager disorganiza-
tion; following that, in Surrealism, as an «attempt 
at reconstruction, at metaphysical affirmation» 
(ibid.) that sought to register a clear awareness of 
the processes that had become familiar in poetry 
throughout the Nineteenth Century. In this sense, 
Surrealism came close to German Romanticism 
not only in the way it made use of dreams; Aragon 
and Breton were interested in the Romantic poets, 
and if later they reneged on them «with great 
injustice», perhaps with the exception of Archim 
von Arnim, it was because of the same «reflec-
tion» that led them to separate themselves from 
Rimbaud in order to aggrandize Lautréamont: 
In the Paris of 1925, as in the Germany of 1800, a 
group of young poets tried to find –by way of an 
organized sym-philosophia and sym-poiesis – a pre-
cise method that would allow them to bring the hid-
den reality of unconscious life into the light of day. 
The spiritual movement is more or less the same: they 
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proclaim the value of knowledge inherent in sponta-
neous groupings of words and in the images that arise 
from the inner shadow; and they seek to bring the 
treasures of the unconscious into consciousness. (ibid.)
For Béguin, Surrealism presented itself as a 
«method» and, as both Aragon and Breton speci-
fied, a method within reach of all. Surrealist prac-
tice is understood as «a continuing series of exer-
cises, comparable to those of mystics, through 
which the poetic grace could be “obtained”» 
(ibid.). This illumination could be provoked by 
«all possible means – automatism in writing and 
speech, the use of drugs, concerted use of halluci-
nations triggered by fatigue, etc. –, those states of 
consciousness in which the spirit, removed from 
logic, achieves a closer form of communication 
with its unknown depths» (ibid.). In this way, the 
Surrealists sought to go «beyond the constructed 
personality, to more primitive layers of being» and 
to capture, as Aragon writes in Une vague de rêves, 
that «mental matter which the similarity of hallu-
cinations and sensations compelled us to consider 
different from thought, of which thought itself, 
just like its sensible modes, could only be a par-
ticular case» (ibid.; see also Aragon [1990]: 14-15). 
Nonetheless, the adoption of this method in Sur-
realism never had a literary purpose, nor did Rim-
baud’s «deranging of the senses»; rather, it rested 
«upon a millennial hope, similar to the dream of 
the Golden Age of Novalis», that stood out, the 
only saviour, «against the sombre background of 
universal despair» (ibid.). 
Benjamin’s critique is directed towards pre-
cisely this identification between Surrealism and 
German Romanticism. Béguin would have made 
a more useful contribution to historical knowl-
edge, if he had provided an «authentic synthesis», 
as Goethe recommended, instead of contenting 
himself with «contemporary considerations about 
Surrealism and Existenzphilosophie» (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: III, 559; Benjamin [1938-1940]: 154). 
With this objection, Benjamin seems to imply 
above all a question: Surrealism and Existen-
zphilosophie can only be understood in relation 
to the process of the «secularization of the mysti-
cal tradition» (ibid.). As Ralf Simon pointed out, 
he draws the attention here on a «seminal motif» 
of Politische Theologie (1922) by Carl Schmitt, but 
to give it a different configuration (Simon [2009]: 
183). Against the backdrop of secularization of 
mystical experience, it is necessary to differenti-
ate between Heidegger’s metaphysical illumination 
and its counterpart, the «profane illumination» of 
Surrealism, which he described as «a materialist, 
anthropological inspiration» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: II, 1, 296; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 209). 
German Romanticism drew a close to this process 
of secularization of mysticism which had start-
ed in the Seventeenth Century. The alchemists, 
the Illuminati, the Rosicrucians, and other secret 
organizations had prepared what, with Roman-
ticism, had come to its end. The mystic tradi-
tion did not go through this process without any 
damage, as would prove the heretical deviations 
of pietism and the thaumaturgy of Cagliostro or 
Adamus Saint-Germain, just like the magical ritu-
als and occultism that invaded the popular strata 
of European society:
Romantic esotericism was cultivated out of this expe-
rience. It was a reactionary movement with all the 
aggressions of that genre. In Novalis, mysticism finally 
imposed itself, establishing itself on the firm ground of 
religious experience: even more so in Ritter. It is not 
the outpourings of the late Romantics that show the 
occult sciences to be newly in vogue, but the return of 
Friedrich Schlegel. In the age in which the seculariza-
tion of the mystic tradition is accomplished, a social 
and industrial development arises that puts into ques-
tion a mystical experience that has lost its sacredness. 
The consequence for a Friedrich Schlegel, a Clemens 
Bretano, a Zacharias Werner, was conversion. Oth-
ers like Troxler or Schindler took refuge in a call to 
the oneiric life, in the vegetable and animal signs of 
the unconscious. They began a strategic retreat and 
opened up areas of elevated mystic life in order to 
preserve that which was established in nature. Their 
call to oneiric life was an alarm signal; it revealed less 
the way back to the soul and mother earth than the 
obstacles that impeded it. (Benjamin [1892-1940]: III, 
559-560)
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3. ANTHROPOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM
In his letter to Scholem of 20 january 1930, 
in which he refers to the «entre-choc» with Hei-
degger’s philosophy of history, Benjamin describes 
the Passagenarbeit as «the theatre of all my com-
bats and all my ideas» (Benjamin [1925-1930]: 
671, 503). Besides, he evokes his stay in Paris and 
refers to the divisions that slipped into Surrealism 
after Breton’s Second manifeste (1929), as he men-
tions that he has just published a review on this 
topic in “Die literarische Welt” (ibid., 504). In this 
text, Benjamin had briefly commented upon the 
appearance of Bifur, a «Surrealist orientated» mag-
azine, originated in «a complete secession, or rath-
er a series of secessions» within the movement, 
on grounds of which a group of authors – Rob-
ert Desnos, Jacques Baron, Roger Vitrac, Michel 
Leiris and others, headed by Georges Ribemont-
Dessaignes – had broken away from Breton and 
Aragon, who had themselves launched Le Surréal-
isme au service de la Révolution (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: IV, 1, 595). In their new publication, Breton 
and Aragon closed ranks and set the «guidelines 
of the movement that converged entirely in com-
munism, raising this group’s ever controversial 
attitude to its most heightened expression» (ibid.). 
In contrast to Breton and Aragon’s orthodox posi-
tion, «the Bifur circle introduces to the public the 
new trends of a less aggressive nature by oppos-
ing to the Parisian-muscovite tone of Surrealism 
an international and urbane tone» (ibid., 596). The 
first issue of Bifur, adds Benjamin, gathers in fact 
contributions from André Malraux, Blaise Cen-
drars, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, André Salmon, 
Jean Giraudoux, Jules Supervielle and Emmanuel 
Berl, among the French authors, Alfred Döblin, 
Gottfried Benn and Franz Kafka, among the Ger-
man ones, James Joyce, Eugene O’Neill and Ernest 
Hemingway, among the English-language writ-
ers, Viktor Shklovsky, Boris Pilnjak and Vsevolod 
Ivanov, among the Russians, Giorgio de Chirico 
and Massimo Bontempelli, among the Italians, 
and Ramón Gómez de la Serna and Vicente Hui-
dobro, among the Spanish and Latin-Americans.
In this context, Benjamin draws attention to 
Emmanuel Berl, who has just separated from the 
Surrealist movement (Benjamin [1925-1930]: 671, 
503). Benjamin affirms that what distinguishes 
Berl is «an entirely strange critical intelligence, 
confirmed above all by one book», Mort de la pen-
sée bourgeoise (1929), «destined to spur a series of 
pamphlets», the second of which, Mort de la moral 
bourgeoise (1930), has also begun to appear in the 
literary magazine Europe (ibid., 671, 504). Under-
lining that Berl is a “Jewish” intellectual, Benja-
min says: «These writings are surprisingly close 
to my own point of view. But to the extent that 
they are limited strictly to critique, the difficul-
ties for those who strive to build on these founda-
tions apparently remain unknown to the author» 
(ibid.)7. Benjamin’s declaration of a general agree-
ment with the perspective of the “First pamphlet”, 
quoted in Pariser Passagen <I> in relation to the 
increasing difficulty of «being at the same time 
revolutionary in the spiritual plane and the social 
plane» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, O°, 54, 1032; 
Benjamin [1927-1940]: 852; Berl [1929]: 40), 
acquires an additional relevance here with regard 
to the “anthropological materialism” that Theodor 
W. Adorno reproaches him in a letter of Novem-
ber 1938, in which he communicates his critical 
remarks to Benjamin’s projected book on Charles 
Baudelaire, by indicating that it is nothing but a 
non-dialectical and «unmediated materialism» 
that shelters a latent and «deep Romantic ele-
ment» (Adorno, Benjamin [1928-1940]: 110, 368). 
Adorno’s objections seem to be as accurate 
from the stance of Critical Theory as they are 
alien to Benjamin’s programmatic intentions, who 
wished to save romantic anti-capitalism and the 
“utopian socialism” tradition that had been repu-
diated by Marxism8. In the final paragraph of Der 
Sürrealismus, Benjamin opposes this “anthropo-
logical materialism” to “metaphysical materialism” 
represented by German evolutionist scientist Karl 
7 For more considerations on Berl, see Benjamin’s Pariser 
Tagebuch, january 18, 1929 (Benjamin [1892-1940]: IV, 1, 
573-575; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 341-343).
8 On Adorno’s objections, see Wolin [1994: XVIII-XXIV, 
198-206; 1999], as well as Barck [2006]: 395-396. 
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Vogt, parliamentarian of the liberal left, against 
whom Marx had dedicated a polemical book, Herr 
Vogt (1860), as well as by the Russian intellectual 
Nikolai Bukharin, who was called «scholastic» by 
Lenin in his alleged political testament (Benja-
min [1892-1940]: II, 1, 309-310; Benjamin [1892-
1940]: II, 3, 1040; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 217; see 
also Lenin [1926]). Likewise, in Zum gegenwärti-
gen gesellschaftlichen Standort des französischen 
Schriftstellers (1934), which incidentally includes a 
brief summary of the essay on Surrealism, Benja-
min revisited this opposition, and argued that «the 
movement broke over its founders under the form 
of an inspirational dream wave», but its «dialecti-
cal development» was such that «the image space 
which it had so boldly opened up for itself proved 
to be more and more identical with the space of 
political praxis» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 2, 798; 
Benjamin [1931-1934]: 759-760). In the kernel of 
that space, Surrealists have «located the home of a 
classless society» whose promise emanates not so 
much from the «didactic materialism» of Bukha-
rin and Georgi Plekhanov, than from «anthropo-
logical materialism» containing their own expe-
rience and, before them, those of Rimbaud and 
Lautréamont (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 2, 798; 
Benjamin [1931-1934]: 760).
Benjamin’s assimilation of Bucharin’s socio-
logical theories to the evolutionist materialism of 
Vogt have led Michael Löwy to suggest that Ben-
jamin is echoing Lukács’s review of Theorie des 
historischen Materialismus (1921), whose German 
translation  appeared in  1925 (Löwy [2007]: 89). 
This certainly cannot be ruled out. However, as 
Löwy himself is forced to admit, the identification 
of the source is not enough to explain the notion 
of “anthropological materialism”. Benjamin shares 
Lukács’s objection to Bukharin’s «contemplative 
materialism» that «instead of launching a histori-
co-materialist critique of natural science and its 
methods, i. e. revealing them as products of capi-
talist development, extends these methods to the 
study of society without hesitation, without cri-
tique, ahistorically and non-dialectically» (Lukács 
[1962-1986]: II, 611). According to Lukács, the 
philosophical mistake of Bukharin, of which his 
theory of society would be a direct consequence, 
is to attribute to technology «an overly prepon-
derant role that completely abandons the spirit 
of dialectical materialism», even if there are writ-
ings of Marx and Engels that could be interpret-
ed in this manner (ibid., 609). From his point of 
view, Bukharin’s «final identification of technol-
ogy with the forces of production» is barely Marx-
ist and entirely incorrect: «Technology is a part 
of – and a moment, it should be noted, of great 
importance for – productive social forces, but 
it is not straightforwardly identified with them» 
(ibid., 610). When the socio-economic process 
that determines it falls out of sight, technology 
becomes «a transcendent principle opposing man 
himself, like “nature”, the weather, the environ-
ment, commodities, etc.» (ibid.). Quite literally, 
it is naturalized: Bukharin separates technology 
from other ideological forms and treats it as a self-
sufficient entity, gifted with its own dynamic. 
In Benjamin’s view, such a “metaphysical”, 
“contemplative” or “didactical”  materialism of 
the communist theory is not transferred «with-
out ruptures» into anthropological materialism, 
as it is documented in both the experiences of 
the Surrealists and  their precursors and  those of 
Johann Peter Hebel, Georg Büchner and Friedrich 
Nietzsche (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 309; Ben-
jamin [1927-1930]: 217)9. Regarding Hebel – an 
Alemannic dialectal poet and evangelical theo-
logian –, Benjamin said of him in 1926 that he 
gave voice to «a metaphysics that is collectively 
experienced and that matters more than any lived 
9 Berdet (2013) distinguishes five directions of Benja-
min’s «anthropological materialism» based on the writers 
Benjamin refers to in his essay and in the Passagenar-
beit: «French utopian socialism» (Charles Fourier, Claire 
Démar, Saint-Simon, Ganeau, Toussenel, the Vésuvi-
ennes, Fusionism and Paul Scheerbart’s architectural 
Utopia); the  «literary physiologies» (Balzac); the «illu-
minated prose» (Rimbaud, Lautréamont, Apollinaire, 
Breton, Aragon, as well as Dostoevskij and Edgar Allan 
Poe), the «German pedagogies» (Jean Paul, Hebel) and the 
«hedonistic materialism» (Gottfried Keller, Büchner, Karl 
Gutzkow, as well as Ludwig Feuerbach, Nietzsche and 
Hérault de Séchelles). 
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experience»: in his Kalendergeschichten (1808-
1815), «Voltaire, Condorcet, Diderot» reincarnete 
as «rascals» and «lumpens», and «the unspeak-
able mean understanding of his Jews has no more 
of the Talmud  than of the spirit of Moses Hess, 
the somewhat later predecessors of the social-
ist» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 281-282; Ben-
jamin [1913-1926]: 433). His characters, under-
lines Benjamin, have a lot in common with «the 
somber and dreadful petit-bourgeois» of Büch-
ner’s Woyzeck (1836-37), that he mentions in the 
paralipomena of his essay (Benjamin [1892-1940]: 
II, 1, 278-279; Benjamin [1913-1926]: 429). In 
turn, Benjamin wrote in Kapitalismus als Reli-
gion (1921), Nietzsche’s nihilism represents mag-
níficently «the prototype of capitalist religious 
thought», which is characterized by the univer-
sal growth of «guilt (Schuld)» and the transfor-
mation of despair into «a religious state of the 
world  from which healing is expected»: «God’s 
transcendence has fallen. But he is not dead; he 
is involved in man’s destiny» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: VI, 100-101; Benjamin [1913-1926]: 288-
289). Nietzsche’s Übermensch is «historical man 
who has grown up right to Heaven» and its notion 
«transposes the apocalyptic “leap” not into con-
version, expiation, purification and penitence, but 
into an apparently steady, though in the final anal-
ysis explosive and discontinuous intensification» 
of humanity: in other words, it means «the break-
ing open of Heaven through increased humaniza-
tion» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: VI, 101; Benjamin 
[1913-1926]: 289).
Something of this experience of nihilism is 
lost in dialectical materialism by «a macula or a 
construction defect» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 3, 
1040). “A remainder” however is still non-thought, 
to wit, that “social” is also “corporeal”: collective 
is not «the matter nor the abstract cosmos» one 
thinks, rather something concrete, natural and 
alive (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 310; Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 3, 1040; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 
217). In Surrealism, the «destruction of aesthet-
ics», qua sphere separated from life, is attained 
by means of a «double articulation»: with «the 
animal creatureliness (Kreatürlich-Animalische), 
on the one hand, and with the politico-material-
istic, on the other» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 3, 
1035, 1040). The «Physic creature» and the politi-
cal materialism «share the inner man, the psyche, 
the individual or whatever else we wish to throw 
to him, with dialectical justice, so that no limb 
remains untorn» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 1, 
309; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 217). Thus, “anthro-
pological materialism” rejects Lukacksian cultur-
alism and reintroduces the continuity between 
nature and culture, body and conscience, mat-
ter and spirit. Benjamin’s thesis, however, does 
not derive from Nineteenth Century evolutionary 
positivism nor from Friedrich Engels’ Dialektik 
der Natur, which was published posthumously in 
1925, but basically from the consideration of an 
event that affects the collective body: «the physis, 
which is being organized for it in the technique, 
occurs, according to its political and objective 
reality, only in the image space, where the profane 
illumination makes us feel at home» (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 1, 310; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 
217). For this reason, Benjamin says in the paral-
ipomena, «the innermost body world is so close-
ly bound to the revolution, so harnessed with all 
its tensions, so thoroughly penetrated by them as 
its own meaning as the great religions of India 
and Judaism were by morality» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: II, 3, 1040).
As a corollary to this issue, Benjamin wrote 
in the last paragraph of his essay: «Only when the 
body and the image interpenetrate one another so 
deeply does all revolutionary innervation become 
a collective corporeal innervation and all corpo-
real innervation become revolutionary. Only then 
can reality be overcome as the Manifest der Kom-
munistischen Partei requires» (Benjamin [1892-
1940]: II, 1, 310; Benjamin [1927-1930]: 217-218). 
A few years later, in the initial versions and the 
notes of Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner tech-
nischen Reproduzierbarkeit, he asserts again that 
modern technique – called here «second tech-
nique» in contrast to the archaic one which was 
linked to magic and ritual practices – is confront-
ed with humanity «as a second nature and, cer-
tainly, as wars and economic crisis prove it, a no 
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less fundamental nature than that primitive soci-
ety had to face up to»: «Before this second nature, 
man, who invented it but has long lost control 
over it, carries out a learning process like  the 
one he has completed in the face of the first tech-
nique» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 2, 444). Just like 
in prehistory «the control over forces of nature 
implied the domination of the elemental forces 
of society», the mastery of  machine technique is, 
for the modern individual, an essential condition 
for «the domination of elemental social forces» 
and the emancipation from submission to labor 
through «the unlimited broadening of room-for-
play» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 3, 1047). Return-
ing to his reflections on “anthropological material-
ism” Benjamin concludes with these words: «The 
aim of revolutions is to accelerate this adaptation. 
Revolutions are innervations of the collective: 
more precisely, attempts at innervation on the part 
of the new collective which, for the first time in 
history, finds its organs in the second technique» 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: I, 2, 717, n. 3; Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: VII, 2, 360, n. 4).
Upon commenting Benjamin’s thesis according 
to which Surrealism overcame religious illumina-
tion in favor of «a profane illumination, a materi-
alist, anthropological inspiration», Jacob Taubes 
related two major issues: the «revaluation of poetic 
fantasy» before natural order and the repetition of 
«gnostic acosmism» (Taubes [1996]: 139, 141-142). 
According to him, the «Surrealist allegory» bears 
witness to the scission between «subjective fantasy» 
and «objective world» already existent in roman-
tic symbolism and in Baudelaire’s esoterism, all 
the while expressing the «lack of world of a nihil-
ist experience», which was firstly associated to the 
principles of revolutionary communism but then 
broke off from the world revolution programme 
in the course of the routinization of revolutionary 
impulse (ibid., 138). Unlike the gnostic protest, the 
surrealist revolt is not aimed at the cosmos stricto 
sensu, but rather against the fatum of natural sci-
ence and technique, perceived «as a system of 
domination and oppression» which has no longer 
«a guarantee of a God beyond the world» (ibid., 
140). Within the framework of “anthropological 
materialism” that Benjamin speaks of, the French 
prefix sur before the name Surrealism becomes 
decisive. The «unique meaning of the word 
Beyond» is poetry, Aragon writes in Traité du style, 
and his sentence must be understood literally, fol-
lowing the erasure of the platonic-christian dual-
ism that occurred in modern poetry: «Poetry itself 
is the Beyond […] The word does not manifest 
transcendence; it is, in itself, transcendence» (ibid., 
136-140; see also Aragon [1983]: 20)10. In sum, 
the Surrealist theory and practice demand a «his-
torico-philosophical interpretation» which over-
comes any consideration «immanent to aesthetic» 
and rejects concurrently their reduction to politics 
(Taubes [1996]: 135).
Indeed, the time in image space which Sur-
realism seeks «is no longer that of progress», says 
Benjamin (Benjamin [1892-1940]: II, 3, 1041). 
Its mistrust of the development of productive 
forces contrasts greatly with the historical opti-
mism of dialectical materialism. The Surreal-
ists, in Benjamin’s view, are the sole representa-
tives of the European intelligentsia to have actu-
ally understood the demands set by the revolu-
tion and to have set their watches to that end, 
although they do not always tell the same time as 
the Third International. Emmanuel Berl made a 
critical remark in this regard in the fragment of 
Mort de la pensée bourgeoise which is transcribed 
at the beginning of convolute a of the Passagen-
Werk: «Since the Surrealists keep on confusing 
moral non-conformity and proletarian revolu-
tion, instead of following the train of the mod-
ern world, they seek to roll back to a historical 
moment in which this confusion was still pos-
sible, a political climate prior to the Congress of 
Tours, before, even, the development of Marxism, 
in the 20’s, 30’s and 40’s» (Benjamin [1892-1940]: 
V, 2, a1, 1, 852; Benjamin [1927-1940]: 698; Berl 
[1929]: 402). For Benjamin, this regressive atti-
10 Ferdinand Alquié, who gives on his part a humanistic 
interpretation of surrealism, reaches a similar conclu-
sion: «Far from seeing in poetry the sign of the beyond, 
Aragon reduces the beyond to poetry» (Alquié [1977]: 
29). On Taubes’s reading, see Barck  [2001]: 311-318.
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tude, far from meaning a confusion, does not 
only explicate why the Surrealists refused to rally 
behind the Bolshevik program adopted at the 
1920 Congress which led to the creation of the 
Section française de l’Internationale communiste 
(SFIC); it mainly indicates which forces must be 
integrated into the revolutionary struggle and not 
left at the mercy of fascism:
For, on the one hand, here there are elements – 
anthropological materialism, hostility towards pro-
gress – that are refractory to Marxism, while, on the 
other hand, speaks that willingness for Apocatastasis, 
the resolution (Entschluß) to gather up once again 
in revolutionary action and revolutionary thought 
precisely those elements of the “so soon” and the “so 
late” of the first beginning and the last disintegration. 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, a1, 1, 852; Benjamin 
[1927-1940]: 698)
The association established here between the 
mystical motif of apokatástasis or restitutio in 
integrum – present in the Theologisch-politisch-
es Fragment, as well as in Der Erzähler (1936), 
where it is taken directly from Origen (Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: II, 1, 458; Benjamin[1935-1938]: 
158)11, and in convolute N of the Passagen-Werk, 
in which  it serves to characterize the historical 
method (Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 1, N1a,3, 573; 
Benjamin [1927-1940]: 459) – and the refractory 
elements to Marxism brings back the sources of 
surrealist revolution beyond the anarcho-com-
munists, utopian and social-revolutionary cur-
rents that took part in the insurrection of the Par-
is Commune and vied with Marxism at the First 
International, Benjamin studied by in the convo-
lutes a and k of the Passagen-Werk (see Benjamin 
[1892-1940]: V, 2, 852-898, 949-956; Benjamin 
[1927-1940]: 698-739,788-795). This genealogy 
not only refers to Louis Auguste Blanqui, Charles 
Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Jacobins 
or Saint-Simonian clubs, but also to the fraterni-
ties that emerged and spread in France between 
11 For a recent in-deph study on Origenian concept of 
Apocatastasis and Benjamin’s messianism, see Desideri 
[2016].
the Restoration and the Revolution of February 
1848. In convolute P, entitled Antropologischer 
Materialismus, Sektengeschichte, Benjamin joins 
together about fifteen notes devoted to the study 
of Claire Demar’s writings, the Fusionists, Evadi-
ans, Vesuvians and other lodges, integrated most-
ly by artisans and small traders, who preached 
palingenesis, the mystery of sexes, androgyny, 
the accomplishment of a true Catholicism and 
the realization on Earth of the «universal light» 
(Benjamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, 971-981; Benjamin 
[1927-1940]: 516-526). It is the secularized mysti-
cism of these sects that Benjamin claims as a fac-
tor of extreme importance for political praxis: 
It is really necessary to the highest degree to cap-
ture, in the polemic dimension that belongs to it, the 
apotheosis of the organization and rationale that the 
Communist Party must tirelessly put to work in the 
face of feudal and hierarchical powers, and to realize 
that mystical elements, though by nature entirely dif-
ferent, also form part of the movement. It is certainly 
even more important not to confuse these elements 
belonging to corporality with religious elements. (Ben-
jamin [1892-1940]: V, 2, a1, 2, 853; Benjamin [1927-
1940]: 698-699)
In other terms, «to win the forces of Rausch 
for revolution» means to assimilate dialectically 
the experience of nihilism and secularized mysti-
cism, into communist praxis. The “profane illumi-
nation” is not an artistic-literary substitute for the 
enlightenment of mysticism or speculative theol-
ogy; it expresses a «willingness for Apocatastasis», 
a «corporeal innervation» of the collective and a 
moral exaltation bordering fanaticism for which 
the Nineteenth Century sects and esoteric frater-
nities were the repositories. This «anthropological, 
materialistic inspiration» works as a true «opium 
of the people», according to Marx’s statement in 
Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie so 
quoted as misunderstanding: «Religious misery is, 
at one and the same time, the expression of real 
misery and a protest against real misery. Religion 
is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of 
a heartless world, and the soul of soulless condi-
tions. It is the opium of the people» (Marx [1843-
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1844]: 378). Aragon plays precisely with this idea 
in Le Paysan de Paris, when he parodies Hegel’s 
inaugural speech at the University of Berlin in 
1818 (see Rubio [2003]: 58). In the middle of the 
conversation between the Human and the Spir-
itual  faculties, the Imagination appears as «a tall 
and thin old man wearing a Habsburg style mous-
tache, a long fur-lined frock coat and a busby» to 
present his new discovery (Aragon [1993]: 79-80). 
«This is not progress», says the Imagination, com-
paring himself with «coco-seller»; what he offers 
is «a drug coming from the borders of conscious-
ness», the «philtre of the absolute», «the genie in a 
bottle, poetry in solid bar», «the machine to cap-
size the mind», «a new vice»: «Surrealism, the son 
of frenzy and shadow» (ibid., 81).
The space towards which the Imagina-
tion points out «with a translucent index», says 
Aragon, is a «small wooden stall where tickets are 
taken for the Modern Theater» (Aragon [1993]: 
84), a  withered place located at the bottom of the 
Passage de l’Opéra, to which Breton ralso refers in 
Nadja (Breton [1964]: 43-44), where plays in the 
style of  the Grand Guignol were performed and 
where, over a century, different attactions had 
taken place: the Europorama of the Suhr broth-
ers, the Gymnase Enfantin, the «panoramic and 
phantasmagoric evenings» of the Polirama Nation-
al,  the shows of «Russian sorcery» of the Théâtre 
Dicksonn, naugthy reviews, comedies and operet-
tas and a cinematograph (see  Julien [1825]: 298; 
Nerval [1837]: 390; Lévy [1899]; Chaveau [1999]: 
387;  Walz [2000]: 20). The subtitle Eine dialek-
tische Feerie of the initial version of the Passagen-
Werk renders homage to this world, evoking a sec-
ondary theatrical form, «widely practiced on the 
stages of the Fair since at least 1780», whose plots 
and characters were based on the «repertoire of 
fairy tales» (Martin [2004]: 256). During the Rev-
olution, especially under the Consulate and the 
Directory, the féerie was aesthetically consolidated 
mainly as a visual spectacle, consisting of a com-
bination of tableaux vivants, songs, dance, mime 
and acrobatics. Bound to become one of the great 
genres of the Second Empire, it merged, towards 
the end of Nineteenth Century, with various dra-
matic forms, and gave its name to extravagant 
shows such as the opéras féeries by Jacques Offen-
bach, thaumaturgic performances by Jean Eugène 
Robert-Houdin or early movies by Georges Méliès. 
The puppet wearing Turkish attire and with 
a water pipe in its mouth, sitting  before a chess-
board placed on a large table, which Benjamin 
describes in Über den Begriff der Geschichte, also 
belongs to that wonderworld. It was apparently 
motivated by Edgar Allan Poe’s Maelzel’s chess 
player (1836), translated into French by Baude-
laire in Histoires grotesques et sérieuses, a book 
that Benjamin logged in his reading list (Benja-
min [1892-1940]: VII, 1, 457). The automaton 
was constructed in 1769 by Baron Wolfgang von 
Kempelen and exhibited in Paris, Vienna and 
other European cities, before it was sold to the 
Bavarian engineer Johann Nepomuk Maelzel, who 
took it to London and the United States, where it 
gave rise to Poe’s considerations on the enigma of 
its functioning. In his memoirs, French illusion-
ist Jean Eugène Robert-Houdin said he had seen 
«the famous chess player» in 1844 at the home of 
a mechanic of Belville and told a long and fantas-
tic story about its invention: Kempelen had built it 
in Saint Petersburg at the request of a certain Dr. 
Osloff, «known for his benevolent humanity», as 
a hiding place in order to conceal a Polish rebel, 
a chess master , who had lost both his legs when 
fighting against the russian empire occupation 
troops (Robert-Houdin [1868]: 160-173). In 1926, 
writer and journalist Henry-Dupuy-Mazuel based 
on this legend wrote the novel Le Joueur d’échecs, 
which was adapted under the same title into two 
films in France: in 1927, the silent movie directed 
by Raymond Bernard and, in 1938, the popular 
version directed by Jean Dréville, in whose script 
the former Surrealist Roger Vitrac made a signifi-
cant contribution by writing the dialogues12. 
In Benjamin’s thesis, written according to 
12 Raymond Bernard (ed.), Le joueur d’échecs, screenplay 
by Raymond Bernard and Jean-José Frappa, La Société 
des Films Historiques, 1927; Jean Dréville (dir.), Le joueur 
d’échecs, screenplay by Albert Guyot, dialogues by Roger 
Vitrac, Doret and André Bernard Zimmer, Compagnie 
Française de Distribution Cinématographique, 1938.
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Scholem and other witnesses under the shock 
of “the Nazi-Soviet Pact”, which destroyed «his 
faith in Marxism-Leninism» (Scholem [1983]: 
64, Tiedeman [1983]: 139 n. 50), the automaton’s 
description seems to combine the image of the 
Polish resistance fighter and the portrait of Mel-
zel’s assistant “Schlumberger”, who would assemble 
and disassemble the machine but would remain 
invisible during the performance, a medium-sized 
man with «an outstanding hump on the shoul-
ders», Poe says in the original English, which 
Baudelaire translates into French: «les épaules sin-
gulièrement voûtées» (Poe [1975] 14: 163-164; Poe 
[1836]: 35). A «hunchbacked dwarf, who is a mas-
ter at chess», is concealed inside the mechanism 
and guides the puppet’s hand by pulling strings. 
Benjamin imagines an equivalent of this device 
in philosophy: «The puppet named “historical 
materialism” must always win. It can easily be a 
match for anyone if it puts at its service the the-
ology, which is known to be small and ugly today 
and in any case has to keep out of sight» (Benja-
min [1892-1940]: I, 2, 693; Benjamin [1938-1940]: 
389). In the Second manifeste, concerned about 
preserving the purity of the Surrealist movement, 
Breton quoted some paragraphs of the French 
translation of the Christian cabalist Heinrich 
Cornelius Agrippa  von Nettesheim’s De Occulta 
philosophia (1533) to justify his motto: «I demand 
the deep, true concealment of Surrealism!» 
(Breton [1929]: 128; Agrippa [1533]: II, 3, 236). 
Benjamin had read Agrippa’s book in Latin in his 
youth (Benjamin [1910-1918]: 248, 55) and, when 
he concealed the threads of Surrealism in his own 
writings, he was consistent with the demand put 
forward by Breton.
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